Exculpatory Agreements and Charitable Organizations

Plaintiff, Andre Johnson, voluntarily enrolled as a beneficiary in defendant, Salvation Army’s, adult rehabilitation program. The treatment program included assigned job responsibilities. During the program, Johnson was injured in a car crash while a passenger in a Salvation Army owned vehicle being driven by a Salvation Army employee. Johnson filed a negligence claim. The Salvation Army filed an affirmative defense alleging that Johnson’s claims were barred because he signed an exculpatory agreement. Ultimately, the circuit court decided that the exculpatory clause in the beneficiary’s admittance statement was a complete bar to Johnson’s claims.  

The appellate court agreed. Johnson v. Salvation Army, 2011 IL App (1st) 103323.  Johnson argued that the exculpatory clause was against public policy in that his relationship with the defendant was akin to an employee/employer.  While exculpatory agreements are generally contrary to public policy if between an employer and employee, the court disagreed with Johnson and concluded that the relationship was that of a beneficiary and charitable organization. The work therapy and training during rehabilitation was part of the rehabilitation process and gave the beneficiaries a sense of self worth. The beneficiaries were not paid for their work. The admittance statement Johnson signed even stated that “I am a beneficiary and not an employee of this center.” 

Johnson also argued that the disparity in bargaining power between him and defendant rendered the exculpatory clause unenforceable.  He argued that he had no free choice or reasonable alternative in bargaining with the defendant over the enrollment conditions and that he had no free choice but to accept the terms or be denied food and shelter. However, the court held that the food and shelter offered by the defendant were merely incident to the rehab program and that the defendant could have sought rehabilitation services elsewhere


Open and Obvious Stairwell

 

On November 8, 2004, plaintiff, Donald Van Gelderen, was at defendant, David Hokin’s home, installing automated window coverings.  As Van Gelderen was leaving the house, he fell down a flight of stairs inches away from the front door, and was injured.   A jury found the stairs were an unreasonably dangerous condition.  The jury found that Van Gelderen was 50% contributorily negligent, reducing the final award to about 1.5 million. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The motion was denied, and the defendant appealed. 

 The appellate court affirmed.  Van Gelderen v. Hokin, 2011 IL App (1st) 093152.  The court distinguished the case of Alcorn v. Stepzinski.  185 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1989).  The court in Alcorn held that while all stairs present some risk of harm, the risk of harm must be shown to be unreasonable to give rise to a duty of care.  The configuration of a stairway may be dangerous only if the stairway configuration masks or obscures the stairs in a way which prevents the invitee from becoming aware of the open and obvious configuration.  The appellate court, here, concluded that the Alcorn court’s decision heavily relied on the plaintiff’s failure to present expert testimony. 

 Hokin argued that there was no evidence that the stairwell was improperly designed, masked, or obscured.  However, the court said the Van Gelderen did present expert testimony that the stairwell was unreasonably dangerous.  The court held that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury findings.  The defendant also argued that the stairwell was an open and obvious condition. However, the appellate court concluded that the evidence fell short of establishing the condition was open and obvious as a matter of law. 

 A condition presents an open and obvious danger to the extent the risk is apparent to, and is appreciated by a reasonable person in the person’s exercise of ordinary perception, intelligence and judgment.  Plaintiff’s testimony that he did not see the condition presented a question of fact, precluding the court from finding an open and obvious condition.

Blogging Jurors

 

The estate of Scott Eskew filed a negligence claim against defendants, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) and Metra, after Scott was killed by a Metra train. In 2009, a Cook County Circuit Court jury returned a 5 million dollar verdict to the plaintiff.   Among various post-trial motions filed by Metra and BNSF, the defendants filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct in regards to a juror who maintained a blog during trial. Cook County Circuit Court Judge Donald J. Suriano denied the motion. The defendants appealed. 

Justice Hoffman of the Illinois Appellate Court, 1st District, upheld the trial court’s ruling. Eskew, et al., v. BNSF, et al., 2011 IL App (1st) 093450. In Illinois, to compel a post-trial evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct, the moving party must produce specific, detailed evidence. People v. Kuntu, 188 Ill. 2d 157, 161 (1999). A verdict may be challenged by showing the existence of improper extraneous information. Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill. 2d 622, 636 (2005).

The appellate court held that the trial court correctly observed that the defendants had not produced any evidence showing that the jurors were exposed to improper extraneous information bearing on the crucial issues in the case.  Further, the blog entries did not indicate that any information was received either from the juror’s husband or from any other source.

The court cited to People v. Runge in regards to the defense’s argument about premature deliberations. 234 Ill. 2d 68 (2009). Although premature deliberations are not proper, they may not be so serious as to warrant a new trial. “The important question is not whether the jurors kept silent with each other, but whether each juror kept an open mind…” Here, the court concluded that the blog’s content was not biased. In fact, the blog indicated that jurors were committed to keeping an open mind and were “guarding their objectivity fiercely until the last syllable of testimony [had] been uttered…”

You can find the juror’s blog entries at http://greenroomthoughts.blogspot.com/search/label/justice