Animal Control- Running at Large Act

Keith Allendorf was an employee of Mr. and Mrs. Clifford Redfearn. He also lived on their farm. On August 15, 2008 the Redfearn's bull escaped and ran loose. The Redfearns asked  for Keith's assistance to retrieve the bull and equipped him with the their ATV to facilitate the search. While in the process of pursuing the bull, Keith was injured when he struck a tree stump. As a result, he broke several ribs.

Mr. Allendor filed suit and alleged in his complaint that the defendants violated the Running at Large Act, in that the bull was the proximate cause of injury and that the bull was improperly restrained. Count II of the complaint was for common law negligence. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing the ATV accident was not in the scope of harm addressed by the Running at Large Act. The defendants also argued that the ATV statute in the Illinois Motor Vehicle code exempts property owners from negligence for ATV accidents occurring on their property. The motion to dismiss was denied and the trial court certified two questions to the Illinois Appellate Court.

First, the trial court asked if the ATV statute barred the plaintiff’s negligence claim. The appellate court held that it did not because the statute exempts “owner[s] lessee[s], or occupant[s] from the negligence claims of “others.” 625 ILCS 5/11-1427(g). Mr. Allendorf not fall within the meaning of “others” and was more like an owner, occupier, or agent because he resided on the property and was an employee of the defendant. In addition the Court looked at the fact that he was driving the ATV with permission in exchange for valuable consideration and as such fell within another exception to the statute.

The second certified question asked if the plaintiff could bring a claim under the Running at Large Act. The appellate court held that the plaintiff could not and held the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was proper. “All owners” of livestock shall refrain and prevent livestock from running at large and “shall be liable for all damages occasioned by such animals running at large.” 510 ILCS 55/1. The court concluded that the plaintiff status was within the scope of “owner” because the plaintiff stood in a special relationship to the animal as an employee of the farm and because the plaintiff was attempting to exercise dominion and control over the bull at the time of the accident. 
The court ruled that the plaintiff's relationship with the animal would put him on notice of the dangers of this animal and thus he could not recover under the statute. 

Allendorf v. Redfearn, 2011 WL 3105714

 

Contact Sports Exception Not Applicable

The Illinois Appellate Court has reversed a ruling by DuPage County Circuit Judge Stephen Culliton.

The plaintiff, Michael Weisburg, an employee of Chicago Acceleration, was assigned to provide athletic training services to the Chicago Steel, an amateur hockey team. On October 24, 2004, the plaintiff entered the bench area to refill water bottles and was struck in the right eye by a hockey puck. He suffered a fracture below his right eye and retinal tearing, which resulted in permanent vision loss.

Count 1 of the complaint alleged that the team committed negligence by failing to prevent players from shooting pucks toward the bench area. Count 2 alleged that Cody Lampl (a player on the team) committed negligence by engaging in “sniping” or shooting pucks at water bottles on the bench. Counts 3 and 4 alleged that the defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct.

In June 2008, the trial court granted the defendant’s joint motion to dismiss the negligence claims, finding that the claims were barred by the contact sports exception. On appeal the plaintiff argued that the exception was not applicable in his case because he was not a participant in a contact sport.

 

The appeals court ruled that the plaintiff, as a trainer employed by an independent company and who was not otherwise engaging in a conduct inherent in the sport of hockey, did not bear a significant relationship to either the sport of hockey or the participants to the extent that the contact sports exception be invoked as a matter of policy. As such the case was remanded back to the Circuit Court.